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MENTAL SANITY AND CONFESSIONS: THE SUPREME
COURT'S NEW VERSION OF THE OLD "VOLUNTARINESS"
STANDARD
by
ALFREDO GARCIA*
A myriad of complex and fundamental values underlie the law governing
the admissibility of confessions. A dichotomy exists between the necessity of
questioning criminal suspects as a vital tool of effective law enforcement and
the equally strong ideal embedded in the fifth amendment's proscription against
self-incrimination that "men are not to be exploited for the information necessary
to condemn them before the law." I The United States Supreme Court has dealt
with the conflict inherent in this duality by fashioning a set of standards which
have evolved as a result of societal changes and, concomitantly, with the changing
composition of the Court. In essence, the Court first devised the rather nebulous
"voluntariness" criterion as the basis for judging the admissibility of a confes-
sion and then progressed to the allegedly bright line approach enunciated in
Miranda v. Arizona. 2
Although the voluntariness standard has not been entirely superseded by
Miranda because it is applicable to confessions obtained through police coer-
cion, in spite of compliance with Miranda's technical requirements,' it has reced-
ed into relative obscurity in the wake of Miranda. In Colorado v. Connelly4,
however, the United States Supreme Court confronted a novel case which neatly
juxtaposed questions relevant to the voluntariness test with issues arising from
Miranda's dictates. This article will examine the issues raised in Connelly, cri-
tique the Court's application of both the voluntariness standard and Miranda
to the facts of Connelly, and suggest alternatives to the Supreme Court's inter-
pretation and application of both the voluntariness doctrine and Miranda to
the unique factual pattern presented by Connelly. In addition, the implications
*J.D.; The University of Florida; Asst. Professor, The University of Texas at San Antonio, Division of
Social and Policy Sciences. Mr. Garcia formerly served as Assistant State Attorney, Narcotics Division,
Miami, Florida.
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Ms. Patricia Calder for her generous assistance.
'Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 581 (1961).
2384 U.S. 436 (1966). The landmark case in the development of the "voluntariness" standard is Brown
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
3 See, for example, United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977); United States v. Murphy, 763
F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1985). Of course, Miranda's prophylactic safeguards are triggered whenever custodial
interrogation by the police occurs. It should be added that the voluntariness standard also applies when
Miranda does not come into play because the suspect is not in custody at the time of questioning by law
enforcement authorities. In this regard, see Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977) and Beckwith v.
United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976). The voluntariness approach is also pertinent to the exceptions to Miranda.
For example, even though statements violative of Miranda may be used for impeachment purposes if the
defendant takes the stand, Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971), such statements are not admissible
for any purpose if they are not deemed to be "voluntary," Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
4107 S.Ct. 515 (1986).
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of Connelly at the state level will be assessed.
Before embarking on a detailed analysis of Connelly, however, it is worth-
while to examine the development of the "voluntariness" standard as a point
of departure for the unique facts out of which Connelly arose. The three
categories set forth by Professors Lafave and Israel as indicative of the "underly-
ing values" of the voluntariness test will be employed to achieve this objective:
that is, the inadmissibility of confessions which contravene the voluntariness
standard because of (1) their lack of reliability stemming from the use of offen-
sive police practices, (2) because they were obtained as a result of police coer-
cion despite their reliability, and (3) because they were secured under cir-
cumstances in which the defendant's free will was "significantly impaired,"
in spite of the absence of police wrongdoing.'
With regard to the first category, the landmark case in which the Court
prohibited the use of a confession in state courts through the application of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment was Brown v. Mississip-
pi. 6 In that case the defendants were convicted of murder solely on the basis
of a confession extracted from them through brutal whippings and other forms
of torture. The Court reversed the convcitions on the ground that the methods
used by law enforcement personnel to obtain the confession constituted a denial
of due process of law under the fourteenth amendment? The rationale of the
decision rested on the unreliability of the confession, given the methods used
to secure it, as well as the fact that the confession was the only evidence which
linked the defendants to the crime.
Although "reliability" was presumably part of the ground upon which the
Brown decision rested, the Court in Rogers v. Richmondg rejected it as a basis
for determining the voluntariness of a confession. The Court ruled in that case
that the admissibility of a confession in state court should be decided "with
complete disregard of whether or not the petitioner [the accused] spoke the
truth." 9 In fact, the majority opinion stated that any consideration of reliabili-
ty to determine the voluntariness of a confession "was constitutionally preclud-
ed." 10 Therefore, the Court in Rogers set forth its position in cases which could
be distinguished from Brown in that subtle psychological ploys rather than
physical coercion were employed by the police to induce a suspect's confession.'I
More germane to the issues presented in Connelly are two cases which
1W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 266 (1985).
6297 U.S. 278 (1936).
7Of course, the Court did not extend the benefits of the fifth amendment's protection against self-incrimination
to the states until 1964 in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
8365 U.S. 534 (1961).
9 Id. at 544.
'Old. at 545.
"In Rogers, the police prompted the defendant's confession by the artifice of pretending to arrest his sick wife.
[Vol. 21:3
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involved the question of the defendant's mental state at the time law enforce-
ment officers obtained a confession. In both cases, the Court suppressed the
confessions by the suspects because they were not the "product of a rational
intellect and free will." 12
In Townsend v. Sain, 13 the defendant confessed to a murder after a doctor
administered a drug which had the property of a truth serum in response to
the request of law enforcement personnel.' 4 The defendant contended that his
confession was inadmissible because it was triggered by the injection of the
"truth serum." The Court held that the confession violated the voluntariness
standard since the facts reflected the complete absence of "free will" on the
defendant's part at the time he confessed. The Court noted that, "It is difficult
to imagine a situation in which a confession would be less the product of a
free intellect, less voluntary, than when brought about by a drug having the
effect of a truth serum." 15
More important, the majority opinion stressed that the presence or absence
of police misconduct with regard to the dispensation of the drug was irrelevant
to the holding.' 6 Rather, the rationale of the opinion was based on the proposi-
tion that any interrogation by police officers which results in a confession lacking
the indicia of a "free intellect" negates its validity, thereby rendering the con-
fession inadmissible. 17 In fact, the Court quoted approvingly from its holding
in Blackburn v. Alabama ' 8 to buttress the principle that the absence of police
misconduct does not affect the admissibility of a confession that is not the prod-
uct of a free will.19
In Blackburn, the defendant was convicted of a robbery which he commit-
ted after escaping from a mental ward. Psychiatric testimony indicated that
Blackburn was insane and incompetent when he confessed to the robbery. Ac-
cordingly, the Court held that the confession was involuntarily given and thus
inadmissible. While the Court mentioned the unreliability of the confession
as well as the unfair advantage of the police in obtaining a confession from
an insane defendant, the crux of the decision rested on the notion of the in-
dispensability of "free will" to a voluntary confession. In a strong passage af-
firming this precept, the Court noted that "Surely in the present stage of our
I2 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 208 (1960). This rationale was also the basis of the holding in
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 308 (1963).
13372 U.S. 293 (1963).
4 The defendant was a heroin addict and suffered from severe withdrawal symptoms at the time the police
summoned the doctor to administer the drug which alleviated the suspect's condition. Id. at 298.
'
5 1d. at 307-08.
16The Court stated that, "It is not significant that the drug may have been administered and the questions
asked by persons unfamiliar with hyoscine's properties as a 'truth serum', if these properties exist." Id. at 308.
171d.
18361 U.S. 199. 208 (1960).
19 Townsend, 372 U.S. at 309.
Winter, 19881
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civilization a most basic sense of justice is affronted by the spectacle of in-
carcerating a human being upon the basis of a statement he made while insane." 20
Indeed, a close reading of Blackburn unequivocally establishes that the
holding was premised on the defendant's insanity at the time he confessed rather
than on the coercion exerted by the police. It is in the form of an afterthought
that the Court delineates the conduct of the police as a factor in its holding:
that is, the eight- to nine-hour questioning of the defendant in a small room,
the absence of the defendant's friends, relatives, and legal counsel, and the com-
position of the confession by the sheriff rather than by Blackburn.21 Unques-
tionably, Blackburn, in conjunction with Townsend, underlined the Court's con-
cern with the crucial link between the status of a suspect's mental condition
and the voluntariness of a confession, quite apart from the role of the police's
conduct in the process.
It is in this context that an analysis of the Court's holding in Connelly must
be undertaken, for the decision signals a radical departure from the nexus be-
tween mental sanity and the voluntariness of a confession that the Court's
holdings in Blackburn and Townsend clearly set forth.
In Connelly, the defendant voluntarily approached an off-duty officer in
Denver, Colorado and told the officer he had murdered someone and wanted
to discuss the crime. The officer promptly read the defendant his rights pur-
suant to Miranda, and the suspect indicated he understood his rights but,
nonetheless, wished to speak about the murder. Perplexed by Connelly's
behavior, the officer asked the defendant whether he was under the influence
of alcohol or drugs. Though Connelly replied in the negative to these ques-
tions, he did state that he had previously been a patient in a mental hospital.
At any rate, the defendant insisted on speaking to the officer regarding the
murder, despite the officer's admonition to Connelly that he was under no com-
pulsion to say anything? 2
A homicide detective then became part of the investigation upon being sum-
moned by the officer for assistance. Connelly was once more advised of his
Miranda rights and told the detective he had come to Denver from Boston to
confess to the murder of a young girl he had killed in Denver the previous year.
The defendant was subsequently transported to police headquarters, where police
records verified that a body of an unidentified female had been found the previous
20Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207.
21 After the discussion relating to the lack of choice by the defendant because of his mental condition,
the Court then remarked that "... when the other pertinent circumstances are considered - the eight-
to nine-hour sustained interrogation in a tiny room which was on occasion literally filled with police of-
ficers; the absence of Blackburn's friends, relatives, and legal counsel; the composition of the confession
by the Deputy Sheriff rather than by Blackburn - the chances of the confession's having been the product
of a rational intellect and free will become more remote and the denial of due process more egregious."
(emphasis added) Id. at 207-08.
2 2 Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 518.
[Vol. 21:3
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year. Connelly then volunteered to take police officers to the scene of the murder,
where he accurately pointed to the murder's location3
The next day, the defendant became confused and disoriented in an inter-
view with the public defender's office. As a result, he was sent to a state hospital
for a psychiatric evaluation, whereupon he was deemed incompetent to stand
trial by the psychiatrist who conducted the evaluation.2 4 After six months of
being hospitalized and treated with antipsychotic and sedative medications, the
defendant was found competent to stand trial.25
On the basis of the evaluating psychiatrist's testimony, Connelly's attorneys
sought to suppress the confession, since the defendant was suffering from
"paranoid schizophrenia" as of the day before he confessed. This condition,
according to the psychiatrist's opinion, prompted the defendant's confession,
since he supposedly heard "voices from God" who commanded him either
to confess to the killing or to commit suicide
6
In essence, the uncontested testimony of Dr. Metzer at the suppression
hearing established that Connelly experienced "command hallucinations" which
interfered with "his ability to make free and rational choices" 27 (emphasis added)
when he confessed to the killing. Nevertheless, the doctor acknowledged that
Connelly's condition did not materially affect his cognitive, as opposed to his
volitional, ability: that is, his ability to understand the Miranda rights.28 Con-
ceding that the voices could be Connelly's interpretation of his own guilt, Dr.
Metzer nevertheless added that Connelly's psychosis motivated his confession 29
The United States Supreme Court reversed both the trial court's and the
Colorado Supreme Court's30 decision to suppress Connelly's confession. Both
of these decisions rested in large part on the principle enunciated in Townsend
and Blackburn that the admissibility of a confession under the voluntariness
doctrine is contingent upon a "rational intellect and free will," even absent
police coercion. 31
In interpreting the voluntariness standard according to the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment, Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majori-
231d.
241d. at 518-19.
21Id. at 526. This fact was not stressed by the majority, but was discussed in Justice Brennan's incisive dissent.
6Id. at 519.
27 Id.
28Id.
291d.
30 People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1985).
3
'The Colorado Supreme Court also cited two cases from its own jurisdiction, People v. Raffaeli, 647
P.2d 230 (Colo. 1982) and Hunter v. People, 655 P.2d 374 (Colo. 1982) to bolster its conclusion that Con-
nelly's confession should be suppressed.
Winter, 19881
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ty, held that police coercion was a prerequisite for an involuntary confession 2
The underlying basis of the majority's holding was an analysis of confession
cases decided by the Court since Brown v. Mississippi33, which yielded the con-
clusion that police misconduct was a causal factor in every case 4 However,
the dilemma which the majority faced in reaching its decision was to reconcile
the precedent established in Blackburn and Townsend with the ruling that "coer-
cive police activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession
is not 'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment." 35
The majority resolved this conundrum by misconstruing the factual basis
as well as the rationale inherent in both Blackburn and Townsend. The Court's
decision stressed the importance of police wrongdoing as a critical determi-
nant to both decisions, despite the lack of evidence to support this contention.
Rather, the majority opinion reinterpreted these cases to mean that mental con-
dition is only relevant to the extent to which it is intertwined with the "in-
dividual's susceptibility to police coercion." 3 6 According to the majority,
therefore, a suspect's state of mind does not exist as an independent variable
under the due process inquiry3 7
In arriving at this holding, the majority in essence shirked its constitu-
tional duty by shifting to the states, and specifically to the "evidentiary laws
of the forum," the burden for the protection of a right which should be accord-
ed constitutional status: that is, that an individual's confession should be the
product of a free will and a rational intellect. Inexplicably, the majority opin-
ion recognized that it might be opening a Pandora's Box by noting that 'A state-
ment rendered by one in the condition of the defendant might prove to be quite
unreliable, but this is a matter to be governed by the evidentiary laws of the
forum." 38
Moreover, the majority opinion rests on factually dubious ground in light
of the fact that no evidence aside from Connelly's confession linked him to
the alleged murder. As Justice Brennan acutely observed in dissent, the police
never identified the body of the alleged victim as the person named by Connel-
ly. The only corroboration of the defendant's confession was his identification
of the scene of the crime: unfortunately, the record does not reveal whether
the "unidentified body" was found at the scene nor does it even indicate that
a crime was committed at the location where Connelly led the police. 9 As Justice
3 2Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 522.
33297 U.S. 278 (1936).
34 Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 520.
35Id. at 521-22.
36 1d. at 521.
37/d
.
38Id. at 522.
391Id. at 530. This critical fact was also conveniently not mentioned by the majority.
[Vol. 21:3
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Brennan also pointed out, minimum standards of reliability dictate that cor-
roborative evidence other than the confession of a mentally ill person be ad-
duced as a precondition to the admission of a confession.40
As suggested by the previous discussion of the Court's decision in Con-
nelly, the fundamental precept of free will as a constitutional foundation for
a voluntary confession was summarily rejected by the majority of the Court.
In a perceptive and prescient article written in 1979, Professor Grano observed
that "Beginning with its very first confession case, decided under evidentiary
rather than constitutional standards, the Supreme Court has premised the volun-
tariness doctrine on a postulate of free will." 41 More important, he correctly
asserted that while police coercion or misconduct played a critical role in most
confession cases decided by the Supreme Court since 188442 one could not
ignore "the cases in which mental freedom alone was crucial." 43
Consequently, the Court in Connelly chose to ignore precedent by strip-
ping the concept of free will of constitutional status and relegating it to the
position of an evidentiary standard to be invoked, if deemed necessary, by the
application of state law.
A useful critique of the Court's decision in Connelly entails viewing the
voluntariness standard in tripartite terms; that is to say, the doctrine implicates
three related strands: the prevention of the impairment of mental freedom, a
stricture against law enforcement unduly taking advantage of the defendant's
deficiencies, whether mental or physical, and a safeguard against the "un-
necessary" risk of a false confession. 44 From the vantage point of this perspec-
tive, the majority opinion in Connelly is fundamentally flawed, for it fails to
protect the values undergirding the voluntariness standard.
In effect, the three strands of the voluntariness doctrine outlined above are
seriously undermined by the Court's opinion in Connelly. Fundamental fairness
requires that, despite the absence of police misconduct, a suspect should not
be afflicted with a mental disease that affects his volitional freedom when he
confesses to a crime. Similarly, the police should not take advantage of an in-
dividual's mental or physical defect, especially of a person "who lacks the
minimal ability either to recognize his own interests or to understand the pur-
pose and function of the interrogating officers." 45 In this connection, it should
401d. at 530-31. Of course this is the elemental concept that the "corpus delicti" or, literally, the body
of the crime, be established independently in order to admit a confession. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK
ON EVIDENCE. Section 145 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
41 Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and The Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REv. 859, 868 (1979).
42 1d. at 869. Professor Grano explained that the Court decided four confession cases under evidentiary
standards, beginning with Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884) until it conferred constitutional status on
the common-law voluntariness doctrine in Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
4 3Grano, supra note 41, at 869. Professor Grano cited Blackburn and Townsend as the two prominent
examples.
44 1d. at 944.
451d. at 916.
Winter, 19881
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be mentioned that, after Connelly approached the off-duty officer and told him
about the murder, the officer became aware of Connelly's past hospitalization
in mental hospitals and was befuddled by his apparent willingness to discuss
the killing.46 Finally, the risk of a false confession is a crucial issue which the
majority opinion in Connelly could not ignore in light of its caveat that a con-
fession given by an individual in Connelly's condition might prove to be less
than reliable.47
Furthermore, due process safeguards prohibit the trial of an incompetent
defendant 8 By analogy, and given the precedent set forth in Townsend and
Blackburn, due process protections underlying the voluntariness doctrine should
also preclude the admission of the confession of an incompetent or mentally
ill suspect into evidence. As Justice Brennan aptly remarked in dissent, "the
Supreme Court has made clear that ensuring that a confession is a product of
a free will is an independent concern." 49 Perhaps the best argument that can
be marshalled in favor of the majority's holding in Connelly is premised on
a fifth amendment rationale. This line of reasoning is based on the notion that
"one cannot trigger a fourteenth amendment violation by violating one's own
fifth amendment right to silence." 5 0 The problem with this explanation is that
it misconstrues the due process anchoring of the voluntariness doctrine and
in essence blurs the distinction between due process protections grounded in
the fourteenth amendment and the fifth amendment's protection against self-
incrimination. Further, the crux of the Court's decision in Connelly rests squarely
on due process, voluntariness analysis rather than on fifth amendment grounds.
The Court, moreover, expanded the boundaries of its new interpretation
of the voluntariness standard by applying it to the concept of the proper scope
of a waiver of the Miranda rights. As a corollary to its holding that police coer-
cion was a necessary precondition to an involuntary confession, the majority
in Connelly affirmed that the sole criterion governing the voluntariness of a
waiver of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was the
absence of police coercion. The majority also rejected the relevance of any
notions of "free will" in reaching the conclusion that the voluntariness of a
waiver of the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination under Miranda
"has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on 'free choice'
in any broader sense of the word.' '15
This conclusion utterly defies logic as well as recent precedent established
46 Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 518.
4 7/d. at 522.
48 See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
49 Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 527-28. In a footnote, Justice Brennan cited numerous cases in which
free will was a significant determinant.
50 Note, People v. Connelly: Taking Confession Law to the Outer Limits of Logic, 57 U. COLO. L. REv.
909, 924 (1986).
51 Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 523.
[Vol. 21:3
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by the Court. In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens exposed the tenuous
ground upon which the majority opinion rested by pointing to the Court's reaf-
firmation in Moran v. Burbine52 that a relinquishment of Miranda rights
necessarily involves a voluntary choice by the defendant. 5 3 It is "incomprehen-
sible;' in the words of Justice Stevens, to maintain that a waiver of Miranda
rights can be voluntary even if such relinquishment is not "the product of an
exercise of the defendant's 'free will'." 54
The Court administered the coup de grace in the third component of its
decision in Connelly by ruling that the standard of proof for proving a valid
waiver of the Miranda rights by a suspect is merely the preponderance of the
evidence. 5 The majority relied on Lego v. Twomey 56 for the proposition that
the voluntariness of a confession need only be established by the preponderance
of the evidence. As an axiom to this tenet, the Court noted that "Whenever
the State bears the burden of proof in a motion to suppress a statement that
the defendant claims was obtained in violation of our Miranda doctrine, the
State need prove waiver only by a preponderance of the evidence." 57 The ma-
jority, as Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion stated, dealt with this issue
gratuitously, since it was neither raised nor briefed by either party and hence
was superfluous to the core of the decision.58
The Court's reliance on the voluntariness standard to narrow the confines
of Miranda betrays an intention to abide by the letter, but not the spirit, of Miran-
da. 59 Indeed, Miranda has been denigrated by the Court to the status of a "pro-
phylactic" standard which serves merely as an adjunct to, but is not compelled
by, the fifth amendment's proscription against self-incrimination 6O
A consideration of the Court's decision in Connelly reveals the convoluted
logic inherent in the majority opinion. The Court's holding is grounded on
52475 U.S. 412, - (1986).
5
"Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 525. Justice Stevens quoted the passage in Burbine which stated that "the relin-
quishment of the right [to remain silent] must have been voluntary in the sense that it was a product of
a free and deliberate choice." He went on to argue that "Because respondent's waiver was not voluntary
in that sense, his custodial interrogation was presumptively coercive" It should be pointed out that Justice
Stevens concurred in the result reached by the majority with respect to the voluntariness issue on the basis
that the use of Connelly's precustodial involuntary statements did not violate the fifth amendment since
they were not the product of state compulsion. See Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 524.
541d. at 525.
551d. at 523.
56404 U.S. 477 (1972).
"Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 523.
51d. at 524.
59 For an analysis of the Supreme Court's evisceration of Miranda, see Garcia, Miranda Revisited: The
Erosion of a Clear Standard, 3 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 19 (1987).
6 0See New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984). Quoting Michigan v. Tucker, Justice Rehnquist
stated that "The prophylactic Miranda warnings are not themselves rights protected by the Constitution
but [are] instead measures intended to insure that the right against compulsory self-incrimination lis] pro-
tected." Quarles, 467 U.S. at 654.
Winter, 1988]
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the principle that a causal connection between police impropriety and the
evidence which is sought to be suppressed is indispensable.6' The problem with
this reasoning, as Professor Grano aptly observes, is that the law of confes-
sions is inextricably entwined with the question of mental freedom. Hence,
the causal connection in a confession is closely linked to the question of men-
tal freedom 2 Further, questions of justice and fairness related to the suppres-
sion issue dictate that a close scrutiny of the question of mental freedom be
undertaken in the confession context.6 3 As Justice Brennan remarked in dis-
sent, the basis of due process necessarily includes the concept of fundamental
fairness, which "emphasizes the right to make vital choices voluntarily." 64
An alternative to the Court's analysis would focus on voluntariness as an
"independent concern" 65 regardless of the lack of police misconduct. The fact
that the factual pattern in Connelly is unique in that most previous confession
cases decided by the Supreme Court contained some element of police coer-
cion does not constitute a sufficient reason for dispensing with free will as a
constitutional prerequisite for the admission of a confession. 66
This requirement becomes paramount when viewed from the perspective
of the inadequate corroboration of Connelly's confession. The Court's novel
interpretation of the voluntariness standard raises the specter of unreliable con-
fessions being admissible into evidence. The reason the Court previously did
not consider reliability as necessary for a voluntary confession 67 was because
prior to Connelly, as Justice Brennan noted, the Court excluded involuntary
confessions, regardless of reliability 8
With respect to the second and third prongs of its decision, the Court in
Connelly critically overlooked the teachings of Miranda. In concluding that
police misconduct is critical to a finding of an involuntary waiver of Miranda
rights, the Court eschewed the dictates of the voluntariness doctrine as well
as of the holding in Miranda. A waiver of Miranda rights must be voluntary,
knowing and intelligent.6 9 As the dissenting opinion in Connelly observes, this
waiver consists of two independent parts; that is, the circumstances surround-
ing the interrogation must reflect both an "uncoerced choice and the requisite
level of comprehension." 70 By merely requiring an abstruse, minimal awareness
61 Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 521 (relying on Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980); Coolidge v. New
Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971); Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921)).
62 Grano, supra note 41, at 876-77.
631d. at 877.
64 Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 527.
651d. This is Justice Brennan's contention in the dissenting opinion.
661d. at 527-28. This also comprises part of Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion.
6 7 Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
68Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 530.
69 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 476.
70Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 533, quoting Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. at __.
[Vol. 21:3
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of the Miranda rights by the suspect for a valid waiver, the majority opinion
emasculated the significance of volitional freedom as a vital component of a
valid Miranda waiver.
Furthermore, the Court should have imposed a stricter quantum of proof
on the government in regard to the voluntariness of a Miranda waiver. A strict
burden of proof should attend the waiver of any constitutional right. At a
minimum, the majority should have required the government to prove the volun-
tariness of a Miranda waiver by clear and convincing evidence rather than by
the weaker criterion of the preponderance of the evidence.7 t
Given the Supreme Court's holding in Connelly, a crucial issue must be
addressed: the degree to which state courts will adhere to or firmly reject its
rationale. The Court's new formulation of the voluntariness doctrine, with its
attendant derogation of free will as a constitutional imperative for the admissibili-
ty of a confession, leaves state law as the last bastion of protection for mentally
ill defendants who give incriminating statements to law enforcement person-
nel. Unfortunately the outlook, while the evidence is sparse, is not too sanguine.
It will be instructive, therefore, to analyze a few illustrative cases at the state level.
In People v. Rhodes, 72 the Colorado Supreme Court, sufficiently chas-
tened by the reversal of its decision in Connelly73 by the United States Supreme
Court, closely followed the mandate of the Court. In Rhodes, the defendant
spontaneously reported to the police that she had killed her boyfriend. The
police administered the proper warnings under Miranda, but Rhodes made more
incriminating remarks. Although the psychiatric testimony was split on the issue
of the defendant's sanity at the time she confessed, two out of three psychiatrists
testified that Rhodes was psychotic at the time she confessed and that the
psychosis motivated the confession.! 4 The trial court suppressed the incriminating
statements on the ground that they were the product of a psychosis and not
the result of the exercise of free will by the defendant and hence inadmissible
under People v. Connelly. 75
Paradoxically, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the trial court's deci-
sion, holding that Colorado v. Connelly required police coercion as a predicate
to an involuntary confession and that the record in Rhodes was devoid of police
misconduct.7 6 The irony of the decision lies in the failure of the court to rely
on a comparable due process provision of its constitution to afford greater pro-
tection to the defendant than that provided by Colorado v. Connelly.
7Again, the majority ignored the precedent set forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. at 475; Tague v.
Louisiana, 444 U.S. 469, 470-71 (1980), (per curiam); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). See Connelly 107 S.Ct. at 522, 531.
72729 P.2d 982 (1986).
7"People v. Connelly, 702 P.2d 722 (Colo. 1985).
74Rhodes, 729 P.2d. at 983-84.
71702 P.2d at 728.
76Rhodes, 729 P.2d at 985.
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In a similar vein, a North Carolina appellate court applied Connelly to
a factual pattern that closely resembled the pertinent facts of Connelly. In State
v. Adams, 77 the defendant approached sheriffs department employees and told
them he had killed someone and wanted to confess. Subsequently, a police of-
ficer was summoned to the jail and transported the defendant to police head-
quarters. During the course of escorting the defendant, the officer noticed that
Adams had "mental problems." Adams confessed to the murder to the officer
during the course of their trip to police headquarters. 8
The defendant moved to suppress the incriminating statements, and the
testimony at the suppression hearing revealed that he was a paranoid
schizophrenic with a long history of mental illness. Moreover, the psychiatric
testimony at the hearing indicated that, several days after the defendant made
the incirminating remarks, his "behavior and statements" were motivated by
his mental illness. 9 The trial judge ruled inadmissible Adams' custodial in-
criminating statements but held that his "noncustodial admissions of criminal
conduct" were admissible.8 0
The appellate court relied on Connelly's rationale in ruling that all of the
statements given by the defendant which related to the crime were admissible,
given the lack of police coercion in securing the admissions. Further, the court
based its holding on precedent from its jurisdiction which conformed to the
ruling in Connelly. 81
Finally, in a decision which is indicative of the reluctance by state courts
to accord more protection to their citizens by invoking comparable state con-
stitutional due process provisions, an appellate Alaska court refused to con-
sider whether a defendant who seeks to suppress an incriminating statement
under factual circumstances similar to those presented in Connelly might be
afforded greater protection under the Alaska constitution's due process clause8 2
Rather than relying on state constitutional provisions, those decisions which
have reached results contrary to Connelly's dictates have instead chosen to do
so on the basis of factual distinctions. Three cases are instructive in this regard,
all of which involved the issue of the voluntariness of the defendant's Miranda
waiver.
77354 S.E.2d 338 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987).
781d. at 340.
79Id.
80/d.
81 1d. at 341, citing State v. Leonard, 300 N.C. 223, 266 S.E.2d 631, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 960 (1980).
82 Macauly v. State, 734 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Alaska App. 1987). The reason offered by the court was that
the issue was not briefed by the defendant and, alternatively, that the defendant's confession would have
been voluntary even if police misconduct was not required. See also, State v. Evans, 203 Conn. 212, 229-30,
243, 523 A.2d 1306, 1315-16, 1322 (1987), in which the Connecticut Supreme Court followed Connelly
on the issue of the voluntariness of the defendant's waiver and refused to extend him greater constitutional
protection under the state's fifth amendment constitutional provision than that provided by the comparable
Federal Constitutional guarantee.
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In Commonwealth v. Cephas, 8 3 the court found that the defendant did not
voluntarily relinquish his rights under Miranda because his mental illness
("chronic undifferentiated schizophrenia") prevented him from understanding
the Miranda warnings and thus from making a knowing and intelligent waiver
of his privilege against self-incrimination. The court distinguished Connelly
from the instant case by noting that "The Court [in Connelly] did not purport
to decide whether Connelly's waiver was knowing and intelligent." 84 The court
cogently added that "This remains a distinct and independent requirement for
the admission of a confession into evidence." 85
Similarly, in State v. Vincik8 6 the court distinguished Connelly on two related
grounds: the defendant in Vincik did not voluntarily approach the police but
rather was arrested and interrogated; and the officers who questioned Vincik
were aware that his physical and mental condition might hamper the volun-
tariness of the defendant's responses.8 7 Thus, the court made a factual finding
of police overreaching in arriving at its decision, thereby establishing the crucial
prerequisite of police misconduct for an involuntary confession under Connel-
ly. 88 Consequently, the court invalidated Vincik's waiver of the Miranda rights.
In State v. Dailey89, the defendant was afflicted with hearing loss, senility,
low IQ and organic brain damage. The court held that Dailey's written Miran-
da waiver was negated by his mental deficiency when he was questioned by
the police and executed the waiver.90 The court based its decision on West Virginia
case law9", and cryptically observed that its decision was not inconsistent with
the Court's holding in Connelly. 92
As the foregoing analysis indicates, state courts have variously attempted
to deal with the import of Connelly, with mixed results. Ironically, the Court's
decision in Connelly is a reversion to the status quo ante; that is, by holding
that a confession is voluntary absent police coercion, the Court partially retreated
from its holding in Bram v. United States 93, in which it conferred constitutional
status on the voluntariness doctrine, and instead revived the old criterion
delineated in Hopt v. Utah94 under which the voluntariness doctrine was ap-
63522 A.2d 63 (Pa. Super. 1987).
841d. at 65, quoting Connelly, 107 S.Ct. at 524-25, including both the majority and dissenting opinions.
851d., quoting Colorado v. Spring, 107 S.Ct. 851 (1987).
86398 N.W.2d 788 (Iowa 1987).
87Id. at 792. When the defendant was questioned he had recently undergone major surgery and was under
the influence of strong sedatives.
'lid. at 792-93.
89351 S.E.2d 431 (W. Va. 1986).
90 1d. at 433.
9 11d. at 433-34.
92 1d. at 434, footnote 2. The court made no attempt, other than its comment in a footnote, to distinguish
Connelly.
93168 U.S. 532 (1897).
94 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
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plied pursuant to evidentiary standards.
In conclusion, the Court in Connelly abdicated responsibility to the states
for the safeguarding of the principle of free will, in essence abjuring its worth
as a precept worthy of constitutional protection. Rather, the Court adopted a
"hard determinist" 95 position by severing the concepts of blame and punish-
ment and, most importantly, mental freedom, from constitutional scrutiny.
95 See Grano, supra note 41, at 874.
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